## TO OLUMBE MEMORITE

THE SECRETARY OF DECENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 2030)

& SEP 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: SALT -- Next Steps (U)

I believe that the time has come to inform the Soviets that the next three weeks at Helsinki should be spent in thorough discussion of offense limitations. If they are not prepared to do so, we should terminate SALT V promptly and reconvene in Vienna as soon as they are ready for such a discussion.

The interim agreement on offensive systems proposed by the U. S. at SALT V freezes in a Soviet advantage of about 550 offensive missiles of which 288 are larger than any U. S. counterpart. Agreement to such a conspicuous U. S. numerical disadvantage can only be politically acceptable if it is clearly offset by agreement to a comparable U. S. numerical advantage in ABM.

The U. S. ABM proposal first tabled at SALT V would have given us a 300 to 100 advantage in interceptors. We have since fallen back, without corresponding Soviet concessions, to a 200 to 100 advantage. This appears to be a marginal offset to the Soviet 288 to 0 advantage in modern large ballistic missiles or their 2278 to 1710 advantage in total offensive missiles. Thus we have very little left on which to compromise.

Yet we are still very far from agreement.

The Soviets have opposed all essential elements of our ABM proposal: They have rejected the concept that the two sides might be permitted ABM systems for different purposes (we-defense of our retaliatory forces; they-defense of Moscow); they have rejected our critical requirement for radar controls. They have insisted on strict equality in purposes, numbers of sites, numbers of launchers, and of interceptors.

The Soviets have so far avoided discussion of our offense proposal, except to reject inclusion of submarine-launched missiles in the freeze! This is intolerable in view of the fact they would already have a numerical adventage in submarine-launched missiles with the proposed freeze, they have a building program producing 128 launchers per year, and are increasing their submarine construction capability to provide 224 launchers per year should they decide to commit this new capability entirely to ballistic missile launching submarines.

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The major bargaining chip we have with the sources is the Safeguard rogram. Our major concern is with the momentum of their offensive wildup program. We have bargained Safeguard down to a marginal two sites. I have not yet begun to discuss their offense program seriously. Out of the first 15 plenary and mini-plenary sessions, the U. S. discussed ABMs times and offenses 3 times. The Soviets discussed ABMs 15 times and offenses never except to reject limitations on SLEMs.

I conclude that we must forthwith inform the Soviets that the acceptability of our proposed ALM agreement is completely dependent upon their acceptance of our proposed ALM agreement is completely dependent upon their acceptance of our offenses until we have heard their response to our offensive proposal and have determined that our positions are close on that subject. Only after we have determined that an acceptable offense limitation is achievable, will we return to negotiation of a compatible ABM agreement.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, FOO WHS

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